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This thesis was written as part of studies in the Degree Programme in Security Management at 
LAUREA University of Applied Sciences and this work was commissioned by the National Emer-
gency Supply Agency.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine if there is a need for a national cyber security programme 
for critical infrastructure called KYBER 2020 programme, implemented by the National Emer-
gency Supply Agency with cooperation with the National Emergency Supply Organisation and 
the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority. In addition to that this thesis examines 
what are the major reasons for the implementation of this programme. 
 
Another goal of this thesis was to develop an evaluation framework for the KYBER 2020 pro-
gramme, by using two evaluation tools, Logic model and Key Performance Indicators. Howev-
er, the writing process of this thesis does not focus on the development process of the evalu-
ation framework, but it focuses to the reasons behind the implementation of the KYBER 2020 
programme. 
 
This thesis is a qualitative research and two research methods were used during the process, 
literary review and interviews.  
 
The results of this thesis indicate that the cyber threats against critical infrastructure are in-
creasing and becoming more noticeable and therefore there is a need for a national pro-
gramme, such as KYBER 2020 programme. The main reason for implementing KYBER 2020 pro-
gramme is that Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and its implementation programme is not 
taking on consideration the protection of the critical infrastructure against cyber threats suf-
ficiently enough.  
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Kriittiseen infrastruktuuriin kohdistuvat kyberuhkat - Onko tarvetta kansalliselle 
ohjelmalle? 
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Tämä opinnäytetyö on kirjoitettu osana opintoja LAUREA - ammattikorkeakoulun englannin-
kielisessä turvallisuusalan koulutusohjelmassa ja tämä työ on tehty Huoltovarmuuskeskuksen 
toimeksiannosta.  
 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena oli tutkia tarpeita kriittiseen infrastruktuuriin kohdistu-
valle kansalliselle kyberturvallisuusohjelmalle nimeltään KYBER 2020 – ohjelma, jota toi-
meenpanee Huoltovarmuuskeskus yhteistyössä Huoltovarmuusorganisaation ja Viestintäviras-
ton kanssa. Näiden lisäksi opinnäytetyö pyrkii selvittämään mitkä ovat suurimmat syyt tämän 
ohjelman toimeenpanolle.  
 
Tämän opinnäytetyön toisena tavoitteena oli luoda arviointiviitekehys KYBER 2020 – ohjelmal-
le hyödyntäen kahta työkalua, loogista mallia sekä keskeisiä suorituskykymittareita (Key Per-
formance Indicators). Kuitenkin, tämä opinnäytetyö ei keskity arviointiviitekehyksen luomis-
prosessiin, vaan keskittyy enemmän tarpeisiin KYBER 2020 – ohjelman toimeenpanolle. 
 
Tämä opinnäytetyö on laadullinen tutkimus jossa käytettiin kahta tutkimusmenetelmää, kir-
jallisuuskatsausta ja haastatteluja. 
 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tulokset osoittavat, että kyberuhkat kriittistä infrastruktuuria kohtaan 
kasvavat sekä ovat huomattavia ja KYBER 2020 – ohjelman kaltaiselle kansalliselle ohjelmalle 
on tarvetta. Pääsyy KYBER 2020 – ohjelman toimeenpanolle on se, että Suomen Kyberturvalli-
suusstrategia ja sen toimeenpano – ohjelma eivät riittävän voimakkaasti ota huomioon kriitti-
sen infrastruktuurin suojaamista kyberuhkilta. 
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1 Introduction 
 
It is Friday morning, 1st of February 2016, temperature is approximately -30 degrees Celsius 
and it is a normal winter day in a small village in Finland. The television is on the news and an 
elderly woman who lives just outside of the village is preparing lunch for her husband. 
 
Suddenly, lights go out. First thought of the woman is that there is nothing to worry about, 
this happens from time to time and the lights will come back eventually. Even the weather 
appears to be normal. As the day turns in to night the elderly couple is still without electrici-
ty and it is starting to get cold inside. Even though, there are fireplaces in the house, the 
couple had decided to not to warm their house with wood anymore due the reason that they 
are getting older and they simply do not have the strength to chop and carry the wood. Even 
if they would decide to heat the house, they do not have any wood at the time. The only cell 
phone that the couple have was supposed to be charged in the evening, but it is not possible 
anymore. The phone goes dead since there is no electricity coming from the charger. As the 
day turns in to night, the couple is forced put more clothes on and the temperature keeps 
getting lower in the house. 
 
The night turns in to morning, still no electricity. The couple is getting worried, but it is im-
possible to leave the house because the couple is disabled and the car will not start without if 
not heated first. The house is getting colder and it is now freezing inside the house. According 
to The Security Committee’s publication Sähköriippuvuus modernissa yhteiskunnassa, it takes 
approximately 30 hours to a small wooden house to reach zero temperature when the heating 
is cut off, when there is -20 degrees Celsius outside. (The Security Committee. 2015, 55) 
 
Suddenly, the man falls in the kitchen, something snaps in his leg and after that the man feels 
excruciating pain. The woman gets scared, house is freezing cold, her husband just hurt him-
self and there is nothing they can do. Saturday is turning in to night and the man is getting 
weaker, the leg is changing colour and both of them are shivering from cold. In the middle of 
the night, the woman wakes up from her sleep and she turns to watch her husband. At first, 
she thinks that he is sleeping peacefully, but then she wonders why there is no steam coming 
out of his mouth as he sleeps. Woman comes closer to the man and suddenly realizes that he 
is not breathing. The woman is panicking and she is trying to do something to save her hus-
band, but the temperature and the tiredness are overwhelming and eventually only thing she 
can do is to sob as she embraces her husband’s cold body. 
 
It is Sunday, woman is cold and tired, the whole day goes agonizing slowly by and woman is 
clearly noticing that her strengths are getting weaker. For a moment she thinks that she 
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would try going the village, but in this condition it would be lethal. She decides to stay with 
her dead husband and wait for the same destiny. 
 
Monday morning, suddenly television opens and lights come back on again. There is news that 
covers the incident that occurred last Friday. Finnish Prime Minister is telling that two days 
ago, 1st of February 2016, the cyberattacks causing power outages took place in when Finnish 
electricity distribution company reported that their service is out of order. These outages 
occurred when a third party illegally entered in to the company’s computer systems and re-
motely controlled the systems. These cyberattacks caused the whole weekend long discon-
nection in to the distribution of electricity. The Prime Minister is speaking in a soothing voice 
and convincing that the worst is over and electricity distribution is working as usual now. As 
the minister continues his speech, two figures are embracing themselves in a still position and 
there is no living soul in the house that could hear the prime minister’s speech anymore. 
 
Naturally, this story was fictional and this incident has never occurred in Finland. However, in 
the incident which happened in Ukraine in December 2015 this could have been possible. Ac-
cording to the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center’s publication Analysis of the 
Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid, the cyberattacks against Ukrainian power grid in 
December 2015 caused an interruption of electricity supplies to hundreds of thousands of cus-
tomers. Even though the power cut lasted only a few hours this raises up the worrying dilem-
ma, the physical effects of cyberattacks, as described in the story at the beginning. This 
cyberattack is considered to be the first publicly acknowledged event that has caused power 
outages. (Lee, R., Assante, M., Conway, T. 2015, 1-3)  
 
The only different aspect, when comparing this fictional scenario to the cyberattack in 
Ukraine was that the power outage was shorter, only few hours. However, the scenario is re-
al. Cyber threat is evident and the day when human lives are lost by the cause of cyberattack 
is getting closer and closer.  
 
The vital functions of the society are hugely dependable of how businesses are protected 
against the cyber threats. Majority of critical infrastructure is owned or operated by the pri-
vate sector and disturbances caused by a cyberattack of another nation or a criminal organi-
sation can have a major effect to the society. For instance, this fictional story is related to 
the electricity distribution which is a vital service for the society and the companies who are 
providing this service are considered as critical infrastructure. 
 
One can only imagine what kind effects of a successful cyberattack against, for example, 
Finnish health care systems can have. It is actually estimated that within the next three years 
cyberattacks against critical infrastructure can cause loss of lives. (The Aspen Institute & Intel 
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Security. 2015, 3) Cyber security is not only protecting networks from attacks, but it includes 
the protection of the people whose physical wellbeing is somehow connected to those net-
works. 
 
This thesis was commissioned by the National Emergency Supply Agency and the focus of this 
work is to figure out the reasons behind the KYBER 2020 programme and how the activities of 
this programme can or should be evaluated.  
 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on the protection of the critical infrastructure against cyber 
threats in Finland and considers if our nation has taken enough measures in this matter. This 
thesis also introduces new national cyber security programme, called “KYBER 2020”, designed 
and implemented by the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) with cooperation with the 
National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) and The Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority (FICORA). This programme is aimed to the critical infrastructure in Finland. 
 
This thesis also suggests two commonly known management tools, Logic model and Key Per-
formance Indicators, in order to successfully evaluate and monitor the activities of the KYBER 
2020 programme. 
 
However, this thesis does not concentrate on to the development process of the evaluation 
framework. The main focus in this thesis is the reasons behind the KYBER 2020 programme. By 
choosing this approach this thesis will be much more interesting and it also serves the needs 
of the National Emergency Supply Agency much better. 
 
The research questions for this thesis are: 
 
Is there a need for a national programme, called KYBER 2020 programme, for protecting crit-
ical infrastructure against cyber threats in Finland?  
 
How the effectiveness of the KYBER 2020 programme should be evaluated? 
 
1.1 Key concepts and definitions 
 
From the following the key concepts related to this document will be briefly introduced and 
shortly explained. All the cyber related terms were gathered from Finland’s Cyber Security 
Strategy excluding the term cyberattack, which was not defined in the strategy. 
 
Cyber Attack 
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The term cyberattack is not defined in Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy, therefore the defi-
nitions is adopted from the National Information Assurance Glossary of Committee on National 
Security Systems (CNSS). According to the glossary, cyberattack is an attack through cyber 
domain which is targeted to the enterprise’s usage of the cyber domain in order to disrupt, 
disable, destroy or controlling the computing environment and infrastructure with malicious 
manner or stealing information or compromising the integrity of the data. (Committee on Na-
tional Security Systems. 2010, 22) 
 
Cyber Security 
 
Cyber security means the desired end state in which the cyber domain is reliable and in which 
its functions are ensured.  At this end state the cyber domain does not cause any harm or dis-
turbance to the functions that are dependent on the handling of electronic information in 
cyber domain. Cyber security contains actions that are targeted to the vital functions of the 
society and critical infrastructure and the goal of these actions are to reach the ability to 
proactively control and if necessary tolerate cyber threats and the impacts of those cyber 
threats on the vital functions of society. (Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy. 2013, 12) 
 
Cyber Risk 
 
Cyber risk means a possibility of damage or accident against cyber domain which, if realizes 
or being utilized, can cause harm, disturbance or damage to the functions dependent on the 
cyber domain. (Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy. 2013, 12) 
 
Cyber Threat 
 
Cyber threat means a possibility of an event or action in cyber domain, when realized, can 
endanger those functions which are dependent on the cyber domain. (Finland’s Cyber Securi-
ty Strategy. 2013, 12) 
 
Cyber Domain 
 
Cyber domain is an operational environment which is formed by one or more technology infra-
structures for electronic information. (Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy. 2013, 12) 
 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) 
 
Critical infrastructure includes all the functions and structures that are vital in order to main-
tain the functions of the society. Critical infrastructure comprises of both, physical facilities 
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and structures and also digitalized functions and services of the society. (Finland’s Cyber Se-
curity Strategy. 2013, 12)  
 
Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) 
 
Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy defines Critical Information Infrastructure as those struc-
tures and functions of information systems that are the basis of vital functions of society. 
Critical Information Infrastructure comprises electronic functions and physical facilities. (Fin-
land’s Cyber Security Strategy. 2013, 12) 
 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
 
Critical infrastructure protection means all the activities which are aimed to confirm the 
functionality, continuity and integrity of critical infrastructure in order to reduce or mitigate 
threats, risks and vulnerabilities. (2008/114/EC article 2. 2008, article 2) 
 
Security of Supply 
 
According to Governments Decision on the Security of Supply Goals, security of supply means 
safeguarding the livelihood of the people, economics, and most critical production for the 
national military defence, services and infrastructure of society in severe emergency situa-
tions. (Valtioneuvoston päätös huoltovarmuuden tavoitteista. 2013, 1)  
 
2 Literary review 
 
In this chapter, key documents related to the subject of the thesis are presented. The focus 
of the material presented is related to cyber security and critical infrastructure. 
 
2.1 Critical infrastructure & Critical infrastructure protection 
 
There are many definitions of critical infrastructure and almost every country has one of its 
own. However, the main concept of the critical infrastructure is the same, therefore there is 
no need to collect different definitions from various sources and in this paragraph the defini-
tions of critical infrastructure are chosen from Finnish and European Union point of view. 
  
According to a European Union’s COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2008/114/EC on the identification and 
designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve 
their protection, critical infrastructure is “an asset, system or part thereof located in Member 
States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, secu-
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rity, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which 
would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those 
functions;”. (2008/114/EC. 2008, article 2)  
 
Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy states that critical infrastructure includes all the functions 
and structures that are vital in order to maintain the functions of the society. Critical infra-
structure comprises of both, physical facilities and structures and also digitalized functions 
and services of the society. (Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy. 2013, 12)  
 
According to Hagelstam, critical infrastructure means those structures and functions which 
are necessary for the continuous functions of the society. Critical infrastructure is comprised 
of physical facilities and structures, but also electronical functions and services. Securing 
these functions means finding the individual vulnerabilities and securing them without com-
promising the functionality of the infrastructure. (Hagelstam. 2005, 16) 
 
The concept of critical infrastructure protection started from the United States in the middle 
of the 1990’s. In the USA it was noticed that different sectors of infrastructure are intercon-
nected with each other even more than before. (Hagelstam. 2005, 14) Technological devel-
opment in different sectors of society has caused the situation where many sectors critical 
infrastructures are increasingly dependent on each other. (Hagelstam. 2005, 18)   
 
Critical infrastructure protection has three dimensions. These dimensions are political dimen-
sion, economic dimension and technical dimension. The political dimension has emerged from 
the common interests of different countries to protect infrastructure systems and through 
that there has been more cooperation between countries. (Hagelstam. 2005) 
 
Political dimension is comprised of national legislation and national needs for the protection 
of the critical infrastructure and international cooperation around these structures. With in-
ternational cooperation the countries that have common interests are thriving to make similar 
solutions and with common security policies and regulations between countries, the countries 
are able to conduct cooperation especially when the infrastructures are belonging to the both 
countries. (Hagelstam. 2005) 
 
Economical dimension includes all those companies and economical entities that are involved 
with constructing, owning and controlling infrastructure systems and facilities. The equitable 
sharing of the costs of securing the functions between different actors also belongs to the 
economical dimension. (Hagelstam. 2005) 
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Technical dimension is comprised of the technical development and the practical solutions 
and actions which are made by the governments and companies in order to protect the func-
tionality of the critical infrastructure. (Hagelstam. 2005) 
 
In order to protect critical infrastructure all of these dimensions have to be in harmony and 
the cooperation between different actors has to be smooth. Therefore, the cooperation be-
tween public and private sector is crucial. (Hagelstam. 2005, 16) 
 
In Finland the critical infrastructure protection is explained in the Government’s Decision on 
the Security of Supply Goals, which states that the National Emergency Supply Agency with 
cooperation with the Security Committee, other authorities, businesses and other organisa-
tions gathers and maintains up to date information about production, services and infrastruc-
tures which is vital for the security of supply.  
 
The National Emergency Supply Organisation promotes the business continuity of the critical 
infrastructure and the ability to recognise the critical dependencies, risks and changes. The 
functions of the security of supply are carried out with cooperation between public authori-
ties and private sector.  (Valtioneuvoston päätös huoltovarmuuden tavoitteista. 2013, 1-2) 
 
This Governments decision is defining vital critical functions and dividing them into two sec-
tions which are critical infrastructure services and critical production. The critical infrastruc-
ture services are comprised of production of energy, data communications systems, networks 
and services, services in financial field, transport and logistics, supply of water, construction 
and maintenance of infrastructure and in special conditions waste management. Critical pro-
duction consists of, food supply, health care and basic services, industry and production and 
services supporting military defence (Valtioneuvoston päätös huoltovarmuuden tavoitteista. 
2013, 1-9) 
 
When considering cyber threats against critical infrastructure, according to this decision criti-
cal infrastructure is obligated to take on consideration in their continuity planning the cyber 
threats which are directed to them and also maintain sufficient protective measures, the Na-
tional Emergency Supply Agency and National Emergency Supply Organisation will support 
critical infrastructure in their actions by the means of reporting, instructions and training. 
(Valtioneuvoston päätös huoltovarmuuden tavoitteista. 2013, 4) 
 
2.2 Cyber threats against critical infrastructure 
 
A survey, called “Critical Infrastructure Readiness Report – Holding the Line Against Cyber 
Threats”, aimed to particularly towards critical infrastructure in United States, Germany, 
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France and United Kingdom and commissioned by Intel Security and the Aspen Institute re-
veals what are major trends in the future of cyber security. The participants of this survey 
were major IT decision makers from 625 public and private critical infrastructure organisa-
tions. There were five major findings what the survey is representing. 
 
Firstly, even though data breaches are increasing, the majority of IT executives believed that 
the defence systems of their organisation were in good or excellent state. Almost 80 % of the 
respondents are seeing that cyber security in general is either greatly or extremely concern-
ing and the attacks against critical infrastructure shows no decrease, yet all of the respond-
ents are stating that they are feeling less vulnerable than three years ago. The survey howev-
er notes that could be only a misconception on behalf of the respondents and IT executives 
might have too much overconfidence what becomes to their capabilities, despite the fact 
that cyber incidents has increased lately throughout the world. The major threat seen among 
the respondents comes from non-nation state actor, such as hacktivists, ransomware, and 
data thieves.  
 
Secondly, even though, according to the survey, many of the attacks against critical infra-
structure can be under way for weeks or even months before initial detection, yet almost 75 
% of the respondents were confident that they have the ability to identify cyberattacks and 
almost 70 % of the respondents were confident that they can mitigate and deflect the attacks 
as well. 
 
70 % thinks that cyberattacks are becoming more frequent and almost 90 % have experienced 
at least one severe attack in recent years. What might come as surprise to some readers, 59 % 
of the attacks caused physical damage to the organisation, 33 % service disruption and 25 % 
initiated data compromise. According to survey, the amount of increased and successful 
cyberattacks against critical infrastructure is indicating that the confidence level of the or-
ganisations might decrease in the future, at least from those who are experiencing more at-
tacks than the others. 
 
Another interesting fact is that 48 % of the respondents believe that cyberattack against criti-
cal infrastructure can indirectly cause loss of life in some point. 64 % believe that this has not 
happened yet due to the effectiveness of the IT security and 12 % believe that attack meth-
ods are not yet to be sophisticated enough. 
 
Due the overwhelming confidence of the respondents, survey is putting on a reminder towards 
the critical infrastructure that they make sure to live up to expectations by taking all the 
necessary measures in order to live up to the answers. 
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Thirdly, businesses are usually reluctant to cooperate with public sector because of the con-
ception businesses have towards public sectors ability to improve process or situation, but 
when it comes to cyber security, critical infrastructure IT executives are confident that inter-
national organisations, governments and national agencies can bring value to the fight against 
cyber threats. Over 80 % of the respondents believe that key for a successful cyber defence is 
cooperation between public and private sector. When considering, which are the main obsta-
cles of successful cooperation between public and private sector respondents’ stated three 
things; lack of budget, different perspectives of cyberattacks among the organisations and 
the lack of other necessary resources. When asked about the forms of cooperation, the re-
spondents were open to all suggestions which the survey provided, such as creating joint pub-
lic-private councils and sharing network and defence information with other organizations in 
the same industry or a national or international agency. 
 
Fourth, in next three years a successful cyberattack will take down critical infrastructure and 
will end up causing a loss of life, especially U.S. and French respondents believed this to be 
very or extremely likely. 
 
Fifth, IT executives still believe that human factor is still the weakest link and ranked the 
most potential cause of a successful cyberattack. Even though cyber security companies are 
warning its customers about the threat of BYOD (Bring your own device) and the diversity of 
devices can serve as a potential attack vector, respondents still see that the lack of aware-
ness, use of social media and use of unofficial online sites are the three major threats in or-
ganisations. (The Aspen Institute & Intel Security. 2015, 3-7) 
 
Like this survey points out, the cyber threats against critical infrastructure are growing and 
almost every organisation participated in to this survey had experienced cyberattacks. Anoth-
er interesting fact is the physical effect of the cyberattack. Due the reason that all the fields 
of critical infrastructure are connected in to networks leaves us the issue that someday a suc-
cessful cyberattack will cause a loss of life. One relieving fact is that IT executives are feeling 
confident of their level of cyber security. However, the survey also points out the importance 
of cooperation between public and private sector and how the respondents are willing to par-
ticipate in to this kind of collaboration. 
 
According to Europol’s publication The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2015 
(IOCTA 2015), cyber threats against critical infrastructure are constantly evolving and needs 
to be addressed in order to protect societies and economies. Weak network security, lack of 
knowledge regarding the automated computer systems and difficulties to update systems in 
critical infrastructure indicates that there will be more efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of 
critical infrastructure. The possibilities, which the Internet provides gives attackers a possibil-
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ity to operate globally and the characteristics of these threats are increasingly becoming non-
state actors, organised groups or individuals. On the other hand, losses of control over its 
technology, the need for having the accessibility online and foreign ownerships are also fac-
tors which can be a threat to the critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructures interdepend-
ence on power grid, telecommunications, information systems and electronic data will in-
crease, and alongside the possibilities to conduct cyberattacks to these different structures 
will increase as well. 
 
This Europol’s threat assessment also provides some recommendations in order to tackle the 
cyber threats against critical infrastructure and one of the main message, like previous survey 
is also appointing, is that the cooperation between public authorities and private sector is 
necessary when addressing the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure. (Europol. 2015, 44-45)      
 
2.2.1 Examples of cyberattacks from the world 
 
As there was a mention in the introduction part of this thesis about the cyberattack against 
Ukrainian power grid, there are naturally also other examples cyberattacks against critical 
infrastructure throughout the world. In the following, few examples are presented. 
 
In Germany in year 2014, attackers gain access to the steel plants office production network 
and through that successfully caused outages to the production machines. These outages 
caused physical damage to the plant due the reason that the plant was unable to shut down a 
blast furnace (Eduard Kovacs. 2014) 
 
Once again in Germany in this year, a German hospital’s computer systems were planted ma-
licious software by hackers, which eventually caused computer servers to go offline. After the 
attack all the data in the computer systems were inaccessible and that led in to the situation 
where hospital staff was forced to rely on pen and paper when exchanging the information 
about the patients. Also, high risk surgeries were forced post-pone due to this attack. (Sarah 
Steffen. 2016) 
 
In Bangladesh, a group of hackers planted malicious software to be targeted to Bangladesh 
Bank officials, in order to gain insights how the bank conducts transactions. After that the 
hackers stole money from the bank by making series of transfers from banks account at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. These actions were seized after Deutsche Bank noticed a 
misspelling in a hackers request to the Federal Bank of New York. Before that, hackers were 
able to steal 81 million dollars from the bank. (Arafat Kabir. 2016) 
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In Finland at the end of the year 2014, a Finnish financial services group called OP – Pohjola 
received distributed denial – of – service attacks that forced OP – Pohjola to shut down its 
banking services. Group of hackers called CoreSec took the responsibility of the cyberattack 
and posted to Pohjola’s Facebook page and demanded 35000 dollars’ worth of bitcoins to call 
off the attack. (Mathew J. Schwarts. 2015) 
 
As we can see from these few examples, cyber threats are real in many fields of critical infra-
structure and Finland is not an exception with these matters.  
 
2.3 Finland’s cyber security landscape 
 
In the following subchapters, Finland’s cyber security landscape concerning critical infrastruc-
ture is presented. 
 
2.3.1 Finland in GCI and EU Cyber Security Dashboard 
 
The Global Cyber Security Index (GCI) is a joint project between ABI research and Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union (ITU) which provides insights of cyber security issues within 
the nations worldwide. The aim of the index is to reveal in what level countries are in their 
cyber security and GCI inspects the state of commitment of the nations in cyber security in 
five different areas. These areas are legal measures, technical measures, organizational 
measures, capacity building and international cooperation. The results of these five areas 
appear as country’s global ranking and what the country-level index is. (ABI Reseach. 2015,1) 
 
Finland is in eighth position in a GCI, however there are many countries that are ranked in to 
same position and Finland can be found in a 24th position if the countries are counted for top 
to bottom. In Europe, Finland is ranked fifth, but again if we count the countries, Finland is 
actually in 12th position. (ABI Reseach. 2015,2) 
 
Key findings in Finland cyber wellness profile related to private sector are that GCI recognises 
the National Emergency Supply Agency as organising preparedness of critical infrastructure, 
but for example Finland does not have any officially identified cyber security programmes or 
projects that can be applied to public or private sector. Finland does not either have any of-
ficially identified national or sector specific programmes in order to share cyber security in-
formation and assets between the public and private sector. (ABI research.2015, 194-195) 
 
EU Cyber Security Dashboard, released in year 2015, is a report that gives insights of what is 
the state of cyber security in European Union member states. The report has chosen five key 
areas to examine in order to build a comprehensive image of cyber security frameworks and 
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capabilities of each and every member state. These areas are legal foundations in cyber secu-
rity, operational capabilities, public-private partnerships and sector specific cyber security 
plans (BSA. 2015, 1-4) 
 
The key findings of the report regarding private sector in Finland are that once again the Na-
tional Emergency Supply Agency is recognised as a key player when protecting critical infra-
structure and the Governments decision on the Security of Supply Goals is considered as na-
tional plan to address the protection of the critical infrastructure. However, when considering 
does Finland have any defined public – private partnerships, the report only partially recog-
nises the National Emergency Supply Organisation as an entity that defines the public-private 
partnerships in cyber security and when considering if Finland has any public-private partner-
ships plans that addresses the cyber security, the report is referring yet again to the Govern-
ments Decision on the Security of Supply Goals, but still underlines that Finland does not have 
public-private sector plans at the moment. (BSA country report) 
 
In general, the report addresses the importance of the public – private partnerships and is 
referring to the fact that most of the critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector 
and by increasing the public-private partnerships in member nations can improve the effec-
tiveness of cyber security with better sharing of information, experience and enhancing the 
perspective in cyber related issues from different entities. This lack of public – private part-
nerships is widely recognised by the study and it is listed as one of the key findings in the 
study and only five nations have, according to the study, have succesfully established a for-
mal public-private partnerships for cyber security. (BSA.2015, 3-6) 
 
These studies might leave the reader in to a notion that Finland does not have any coopera-
tion between public authorities and private sector in a field of cyber security. However, the 
case is not so. For instance, the National Cyber Security Center Finland is providing assistance 
to the critical infrastructure, which includes also private companies, in a matter of cyber se-
curity. One good example of this kind of assistance is HAVARO system, which will be covered 
shortly in the later parts of this thesis. 
 
And what comes to the National Emergency Supply Agency and National Emergency Supply 
Organisation, aligning the cooperation between private sector and public authorities is one of 
the fundamental tasks of NESA and same example serves with this case also, HAVARO. There 
are also other programmes and recent activities, such as KYBER – TEO, which are aimed to the 
critical infrastructure. KYBER – TEO initiative will be also covered shortly in this thesis. 
 
2.3.2 Perceptions of cyber threats in Finnish businesses  
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Taloustutkimus OY conducted a study called Yrityksiin kohdistuvat kyberuhat 2015 on behalf 
of the Helsinki Chamber of Commerce in year 2015 where 748 Finnish enterprises were ap-
proached with issue regarding cyber threats against their businesses. Main focus of the study 
was to research what kind of impressions businesses had about cyber threats against them and 
how they should prepare themselves against those threats. The answers for this study were 
collected from different fields of business, such as industry, construction industry, service 
industry and commercial industry and most of the answers came from the small and medium 
size enterprises and 12 % of the answers came from large enterprises comprising 200 or more 
employees. (Taloustutkimus. 2015, 5) 
 
The study categorizes five major findings. Firstly, the awareness of the businesses needs to 
be increased. For example, two thirds of the respondents did not know where they can reach 
information about cyber threats against businesses. According to this study information is 
available, produced mainly by The National Cyber Security Center Finland, but businesses 
needs to learn where the information is. Another reason for the lack of information is that 
businesses do not know the roles of the authorities regarding cyber security. For instance, 
four out of five respondents do not know or is little aware of the functions of authorities in 
cyber security scheme. 
 
Secondly, the readiness of the businesses to recognize cyberattacks is weak. For example, 
one third of the companies would not even notice if they are under cyberattack and only 1 
out of ten companies are constantly following and analysing log information. 34 % of the re-
spondents have a capability to detect cyberattacks with their own measures, but there is a 
substantial amount of companies who are reliable of getting information or warnings about 
cyberattacks from the National Cyber Security Center Finland or telecommunication compa-
nies. 
 
Thirdly, too few companies have full-time information security chief or similar and only six 
per cents of respondents claimed that they had a person who is fully responsible of infor-
mation security matters in their company. 
 
Fourth, there is little existence of contingency planning concerning cyber threats in the busi-
nesses, only 31 %. Nine out of ten enterprises have not had any exercises against cyber threat 
situations and four per cent had trained against external advisory, which, according to this 
study, is the best way to find if company has reliable and effective continuity planning re-
grading cyber threats. 
 
Last, the training of the staff needs to be increased. According to the study only 10 % of the 
respondents believed that staff members will notice if the company is under cyberattack and 
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the biggest obstacle for effective cyber security companies sees the staff’s disregard against 
information security and cyber threats. (Taloustutkimus. 2015, 47-48) 
 
The study raises some worrying dilemmas within the cyber security scheme in Finnish compa-
nies. Even though the majority of the respondents were small companies and not necessarily 
categorized as critical infrastructure, the lack knowledge of the cyber threats and the 
knowhow of how these threats can avoided or even where to go to if cyber threat incident 
occurs is alarming. If Finland is aiming to be the global number one country in cyber security 
there has to be more effort put to the protection of the business life. Nevertheless, business-
es, especially those categorized critical infrastructure, are the working backbone of the na-
tion and the functionality of the industry is vital for the society.  
 
One interesting fact is that National Emergency Supply Agency was not even once mentioned 
in the study, even though NESA is mandated to assist Finnish business life through reporting, 
instructions and training. Of course, one cannot be sure were there any businesses catego-
rized as critical infrastructure in the study. Still, NESA is supposed to be the link between the 
private and public sector, including cyber security. For example, NESA has made a cyber se-
curity manual for small and medium enterprises, but one can only imagine if Finnish compa-
nies have taken the manual in to consideration. The manual for example guides the compa-
nies to deal with cyber security from the executive point of view, handles safe procedures of 
information technologies and how to safely outsource company’s websites. This guide also 
informs where to report when cyber incident occurs and even practical guidelines for building 
strong passwords. (Huoltovarmuuskeskus. 2013, 11-12)  
 
Even though the study was not specifically targeted only for critical infrastructure it reveals, 
at some level, in what condition is the awareness of cyber threats in the Finnish business life. 
Hopefully those companies which are categorized as critical infrastructure are handling their 
cyber security issues with better understanding than this study lets us to understand. 
 
 
2.3.3 Finland’s National Risk Assessment on cyber threats 
 
According to Finland’s National Risk Assessment, Finland is highly developed information soci-
ety and is extremely dependent on the functions of the information networks and systems. 
Cyber threats against information systems will be highly significant matter when concerning 
the security of the society. Global cyber operational environment is comprised of complex 
information networks which retain information networks of the people, authorities and busi-
ness entities and also different control systems of the critical infrastructure. 
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Because of the reason that network management systems, databanks and different kind of 
components are abroad, it gives Finland challenges in terms of risk management and contin-
gency planning, for example the whole Finnish payment transactions are dependent of func-
tional data network connections to abroad. With corporate acquisitions, the expertise in the 
field of cyber security might get transferred to abroad and there can be also a possibility that 
large multinational corporations does not take in consideration national needs in terms of 
cyber security. Majority of Finland’s vital functions are based on the data transmission and 
the functions of information systems and many services that society provides are intercon-
nected to electrical services. The global markets are changing from traditional methods and 
structures, and the ability to utilize digital information will define the position of the nations 
at global markets in significant manner in all fields of industry.  
 
The amount of cybercrimes has also increased and will continue its growth especially when 
the Internet of Things (IoT) is coming more and more available in the society, this phenomena 
gives cyber criminals more ways to commit cybercrimes. According to the National Risk As-
sessment, the ability of the criminals to reach their goals in the target is much more efficient 
than the targets ability to detect intruders, and it is estimated that with the current re-
sources what police have, the ability to solve cybercrimes will decrease significantly and it 
will lower the trust against the authorities e.g. from the companies. In severe cybercrimes 
there is usually strong international dimension, severe threat to society and its vital infor-
mation systems. 
  
According to the risk assessment, Cyberattacks against Finland can be a part of wider crisis or 
conflict in Europe and can be caused by another nation or terrorist organisation and one of 
the means of political pressure against Finland is directing cyberattacks against critical infra-
structure. For example cyber threats against social and health care systems can lead in to a 
loss of lives and threats against financial market information systems can produce serious 
economic damage. Risk assessment also reminds us that most of the critical infrastructure is 
in the private sector which means that the activities of the businesses are guided commercial 
expediency, which again means that there can be challenges in terms of contingency planning 
towards cyber security. 
 
The Finland’s National Risk Assessment is also raising the issue that if a successful cyberattack 
is targeted against critical infrastructure, there is a possibility that these attacks can cause 
fatal incidents. (Ministry of Interior. 2015,18-21) 
 
2.3.4 Security Strategy for Society 
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Security Strategy for Society is decision in principle approved by Finnish government in year 
2010 and this strategy comprises the foundation of common contingency planning and crisis 
management for all the actors in Finland’s security landscape. The strategy is drafted from 
the perspective of the functions that are vital for society and which needs to be secured in 
every situations. The strategy defines all the vital functions of the society, the threat scenar-
ios which are endangering those functions, strategic duties of the ministries, basics of the 
crisis management and the principles of monitoring and development of the execution of the 
strategy. (Ministry of Defence. 2010, 3) 
 
According to strategy, all vital functions of the society will be secured with cooperation be-
tween the administration and the goal of the strategy is to avoid overlapping when developing 
the resources to secure those vital functions. These vital functions of the Finnish society are 
management of government affairs, international activity, defence capability, internal securi-
ty, functioning of the economy and infrastructure, income security and population’s capabil-
ity to function in emergency situations and psychological resilience to crisis.  (Ministry of De-
fence. 2010, 15) 
 
The Security Strategy of Society has defined thirteen threat scenarios in order to support dif-
ferent actors when planning contingency and those threat scenarios are designed to be han-
dled within cooperation with different administrative sectors. These threat scenarios are 
 
 Serious disturbances in the power supply 
 Cyber threats 
 Disturbances in transport logistics 
 Serious disruptions in public utilities  
 Disturbances in food supply 
 Disturbances in the financial sector and in payment systems  
 Disruptions in the availability pf public funding 
 Disturbances in the welfare and health of the people  
 Extreme natural phenomena’s, major accidents and environmental threats  
 Terrorism and criminality which will endanger social order 
 Disturbance in border security 
 Political, military and economic pressure  
 The use of military against the country. (Ministry of Defence. 2010, 65-78) 
 
As seen above, Security Strategy for Society is defining cyber threats as one of the threat 
scenarios. Strategy states that the services and functions of the society are mostly connected 
to networks and majority of the society’s critical services are based on data transfer and the 
usage of the electronical databanks. There are several phenomena’s that can threat society’s 
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electrical services, such as natural disasters, human actions and accidents caused by the fail-
ure of the technology. According to strategy everyone who is in some way connected to in-
formation networks can be target of malicious or non-malicious disturbance, especially 
cyberattacks can be targeted against network operators and entities involved with electronic 
commerce, but also industry, communities and public services. (Ministry of Defence. 2010, 
66-67) From the next two figures can be seen how different disturbances can be connected 
into cyber threat scenario. 
 
Figure 1: Possible disturbances & their connection to threat scenarios in the strategy. (Minis-
try of Defence.2010, 80) 
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Figure 2: Possible disturbances & their connection to threat scenarios in the strategy. (Minis-
try of Defence. 2010, 82) 
 
When concerning security of supply and protecting critical infrastructure, the Security Strate-
gy for Society is referring to the Government’s decision on the security of supply goals and is 
emphasizing the responsibility of the National Emergency Supply Agency and its duties to en-
hance and align the capability of public authorities to guide private sector during emergency 
situations or similar. This strategy also states the main responsibilities of the ministries in the 
matter of the security of supply for better coordination of the goals of the security of supply. 
For example, the Ministry of Transport and Communications is responsible of maintaining and 
developing the operational preconditions of the electric communications infrastructure in 
matters of the security of supply.   (Ministry of Defence. 2010, 63-64) 
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2.3.5 Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy 
 
Finland published its first cyber security strategy in year 2013 and this strategy is defining all 
the essential goals and policies which are aimed to answer all to the challenges regarding 
cyber domain and also securing the functions of the cyber domain. This cyber security strate-
gy is a part of the Security Strategy for Society and cyber security strategy is following the 
same principles and definitions that are in the Security Strategy for Society and in the Gov-
ernments Decision on the Security of Supply Goals. Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy provides 
the vision, operational model and strategic alignments. According to strategy, the highest 
authority in cyber security falls in to the Prime Minister’s Office. Each and every ministry has 
their own strategic tasks and they are responsible of the cyber security and disturbances 
caused by cyber threats within their administrative branch. (The Security Committee. 2013, 
1-4)  
 
According to the strategy, Finland as a small, capable and cooperative country have all the 
possibilities to become one of the leading countries when regarding cyber security issues and 
the vision of this strategy is that 
 Finland is able to protect its vital functions in all situations concerning cyber threats 
 Authorities, citizens and companies has a possibility to efficiently utilize safe cyber 
domain 
 Finland will be a worldwide pioneer in contingency planning and in controlling cyber 
threats by the year 2016 (The Security Committee. 2013, 3) 
 
Figure 3: Vision of Cyber Security (The Security Committee. 2013, 3) 
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Finland’s Cyber Strategy background dossier states that a global cyber domain is comprised of 
complex worldwide information networks which contain players from national security au-
thorities to critical infrastructure and its controlling systems. Global cyber domain has 
brought the people closer to each other and has made life much easier in many ways. Howev-
er, it has also brought new problems and risks. If information technology is not working 
properly or cyberattacks are affecting to society it can reduce people’s trust to public ser-
vices, business life and government. Cyber domain has also changed traditional international 
power arrangements and it gives possibilities to the smaller actors to function in a global 
cyber domain.  
 
Cyberattacks can paralyse or create massive disturbances to the critical infrastructure and 
through cyberattacks nations can be pressured into political, military or economic conces-
sions. The openness of cyber domain gives the possibility to attack from every corner of the 
world and Finland as one of the most advanced information societies is greatly affected by 
the cyber domain. According to a dossier Finland has already been a target of cyberattacks 
and the constant development of the cyber domain will increase the threat to be under more 
severe attacks. (The Security Committee. 2013, 17-18) 
 
According to the dossier, year 2010 was a beginning of the new era when Stuxnet worm was 
exposed. With this worm it was confirmed that cyberattacks can produce physical damage 
also when with the help of this worm Iranian nuclear plant was attacked and physically dam-
aged the centrifuges which were used to enrich uranium. It is estimated that this cyberattack 
delayed Iranian nuclear programme for years. This raised the concern of the possibility to the 
attacks against the industry using automatization and with this new era of cyber security this 
type industry might be the first ones to attack when the goal is ultimately to harm and affect 
the vital functions of the society. (The Security Committee. 2013, 18) 
 
Finland’s cyber threat scenario is comprised of five elements. These elements are cyber ac-
tivism, cybercrime, cyber espionage, cyber terrorism and cyber operations. Cyber threat sce-
nario means the description of the disturbance caused by the cyber threats and the mecha-
nism, source, target and the impact it have to the target. Threats can fall upon directly or 
indirectly against the vital functions of the society such as critical infrastructure and it can 
come whether from inside or outside of the nation’s borders. (The Security Committee. 2013, 
18) 
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Figure 4: Finland's cyber threat scenario (The Security Committee. 2013, 19) 
 
Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy has defined ten strategic alignments in order to develop 
national cyber security. These alignments will create the preconditions to the realization of 
strategy’s vision and through the Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy implementation pro-
gramme where these alignments are put in concrete level. These ten alignments are 
1. Creating an effective cooperation model between authorities and other actors in or-
der to enhance cyber security and preventing cyber threats 
2. Improving the comprehensive understanding of the cyber security of those actors who 
are involved with securing the most vital functions of the society 
3. Maintaining and developing the ability of detecting, eliminating and recovering from 
cyber threats and malfunctions against the organisations and companies who are es-
sential for the vital functions of the society 
4. Making sure that the police has effective preconditions to prevent, uncover and solve 
crimes that fall upon cyber domain 
5. The Finnish Defence Forces will create a comprehensive cyber defence ability 
6. Reinforcing national cyber security capability by actively and efficiently participating 
to the functions of the focal international organisations 
7. Improving the cyber capabilities and understanding of all the essential actors in the 
society 
8. Making sure of an effective cyber security functions with national legislation 
9. Defining the tasks and service models to authorities and business life and common 
foundation to manage the requirements of cyber security 
10. Monitoring the implementation of the strategy (The Security Committee. 2013, 7-11) 
 
 
When considering critical infrastructure the Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy is, similar as 
Security Strategy for Society, emphasizing the role of the National Emergency Supply Organi-
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sation in whole. For example, the third strategic alignment is aimed for the critical infra-
structure and the goal of the alignment is to secure continuity of the most vital businesses in 
a case of a cyber disturbance situation. NESO has a vital role in ensuring the functions of the 
critical infrastructure and critical production in all situations with correct contingency plan-
ning. (The Security Committee. 2013, 8) 
 
After Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy came its implementation programme in year 2014, 
which is listing 74 proposals that needs to be addressed in order to achieve the goals what 
Finland has set in its strategy. This implementation programme is also defining six central 
targets of development and these main targets of development of the programme are  
 Establishing the National Cyber Security Center Finland 
 Nations round-the-clock information security activity  
 Encrypted data transfer and management of network security service integration pro-
ject  
 Police capability in cybercrime prevention  
 Development of the legislation concerning cyber domain  
 Cyber security and research, education and other methods of competence develop-
ment (The Security Committee. 2014, 2) 
 
These 74 proposals are divided into two major themes, ”Effective and secure public admin-
istration” and ”The wellbeing of the citizens and the success of the companies”, the first 
theme is comprised of 18 main proposals with sub proposals attached to some of them and 
the second theme is comprised of 13 main proposals, all of these proposals are connected to 
the strategic alignments of the cyber security strategy. 
 
Every proposal is comprised of the name of the proposal, the main responsible party, possible 
requirements of reforming or renewal of the legislation and in what strategic alignment the 
proposal is connected. NESA is named the main responsible party in seven proposals which 
some of them are not in operation anymore, such as previously mentioned KYBER-TEO initia-
tive which ended in its current form in at the end of the year 2015, but continues its exist-
ence, as one of the themes, in the KYBER 2020 programme. (The Security Committee. 2014, 
24-55) 
 
In the following chapter some criticism over the strategy and its implementation programme 
is presented. 
 
2.3.6 Criticism over Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and its implementation programme 
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As the Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy serves as a fundamental guiding security strategy in 
Finland and serves also as a framework for the KYBER 2020 programme, the strategy and its 
implementation programme has been receiving some criticism over the effectiveness of it. 
 
According to the study Cyber security competencies in Finland – Current state and roadmap 
for the future published by Finland’s Prime Minister Office at February 2016, Finland’s Cyber 
Security Strategy has been claimed to be too authority oriented  and it is missing the identifi-
cations of such factors which truly would make Finland a worldwide pioneer in cyber security 
matters. The strategy is concerned as some form of compromise and there has also been crit-
icism over its implementation programme and the slender resources allocated to these 74 
proposals. It seems that Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy has not been able create common 
strong vision and the spirit of cooperation between different actors within cyber security 
field. (Prime Minister’s Office. 2016, 34)  
 
The same study also stating that Finland is lacking a cooperative operations model, whereby 
confidential and profound exchange of information can be shared between actors who are 
involved with cyber security. The study is suggesting that Finland needs a Cyber Security 
Committee, a national cooperation body which reinforces the coordination between public 
sector, scientific community and private sector. (Prime Minister’s Office. 2016, 70)  
 
Aalto University’s professor of cyber security Jarno Limnell is also questioning if Finland’s 
Cyber Security Strategy has reached one of its targets to be one of worldwide pioneers in 
cyber security. According to Limnell, Finland cannot pronounce itself as a pioneer in these 
matters and to back up his thoughts Limnell is referring worldwide studies conducted by Eu-
ropean Union and United Nations, even though Finland has succeed relatively well in this 
studies. Limnell is also adding that it is difficult to compare nations between each other due 
the reason that there are no established measurements and not all the necessary information 
is available. When concerning nation’s maturity level in cyber security, there are several fac-
tors to consider, for example, legislation, public-private cooperation and the level of common 
understanding. There has been positive advance in the development of Finland’s cyber securi-
ty and Limnell is mentioning that there has been improvement in international cooperation, 
development of cyber defence capabilities, the readiness to detect and repel cyber threats 
and general knowledge of cyber security has been increased. In order to improve Finland’s 
cyber security Limnell is highlighting six different issues in which should be taken on consid-
eration. 
 
Firstly, the leadership of national cyber security is too widespread to the different actors in 
society, therefore there has to be comprehensive leadership between government, business 
life and science world. 
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Secondly, Finland has to decide what is its ambition in national cyber security issues and allo-
cate the right amount of resources to it in order become the worldwide pioneer. According to 
Limnell, Finland have all the capabilities to achieve that status. 
 
Thirdly, there is a shortage of skilled persons in cyber security, even though education and 
research has increased, but the level of knowhow has to be increased too. There has to be 
better coordination between educational establishments and the research of cyber security 
needs to be more versatile. 
 
Fourth, even though one strategic alignment of Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy was to im-
prove national legislation, according to Limnell, Finland has not been effective enough in that 
matter. Modernity of legislation is one of the key criteria when estimating the level cyber 
security in international comparison and clear legislation will secure the basic rights of indi-
viduals and gives business life better possibility to design its functions and making invest-
ments. 
 
Fifth, the transportation of successful Finnish companies to foreign ownership is compromis-
ing Finland’s cyber self- sufficiency and there has to be, if necessary, government measures 
taken in order to keep the top expertise in Finland and therefore Finland’s export markets 
needs to be more supported. 
 
Sixth, it is important that common knowledge about cyber security issues reaches each and 
every citizen because the cyber knowhow of the people serves also as one the criteria when 
measuring the level of nation’s maturity in cyber security. (Jarno Limnéll. 2016) 
 
Even the members of Finnish parliament do not believe in the Finland’s Cyber Security Strat-
egy. In Limnélls study, Kansanedustajien arvioita Suomen kyberturvallisuuden nykytilasta ja 
tulevaisuudesta which is was aimed to the members of Finnish parliament in order to figure 
out what are their perceptions on the current status and the future cyber security in Finland. 
As one of the conclusions, the study is highlighting the lack of efficiency of Finland’s Cyber 
Security Strategy. For example, even though there has been good work done after the Fin-
land’s Cyber Security Strategy the members of parliament still do not believe that Finland has 
achieved the status of being one of the leading countries in cyber security, like it is stated in 
the strategy’s vision. (Limnéll. 2016, 16) 
 
When the members of parliament were asked in a scale of one to ten, how likely they consid-
er a scenario that within the next three years there will be a cyberattack against critical in-
frastructure almost fifty percent considered the possibility to be high. Limnéll is estimating 
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that this answer is indicating that there is a political need to take more on consideration the 
protection of critical infrastructure against cyber threats. (Limnell. 2016, 10-11)  
 
Earlier of this thesis presented study about perceptions of cyber threats in Finnish business 
life, conducted by Taloustutkimus OY, is also giving its own contribution to the criticism 
against Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy. According to the study, the highest level of the na-
tional leadership in cyber security is represented by the government. However, there is no 
clear reference what body is in charge of leading and coordinating every day activities of the 
authorities in reality. There is National Cyber Security Center Finland which is giving infor-
mation about cyber threats and attacks but does not have; according the study, clear leader-
ship mandate in cyber security seems to be missing. (Taloustutkimus. 2015, 28) 
 
On behalf of National Cyber Security Center Finland one can argue that, according to the im-
plementation programme of the Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy, there is no authority given 
to the National Cyber Security Center Finland, but rather act as a service element to those 
government authorities who are responsible of the cyber security in Finland. (The Security 
Committee. 2013, 37) 
 
The former Chief Executive Officer of the National Emergency Supply Agency Ilkka Kananen is 
also reminding us about the defects of the Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and especially 
the making process of it. According to Kananen, the ten strategic alignments of the strategy 
was an outcome of compromise and the preparing process of the strategy was agonising and 
frustrating. Kananen is estimating that probably not all of the participants acknowledged that 
cyber security cannot be only governmental project.  
 
Kananen states that there were only little alignments that were concerning the preparedness 
of the critical infrastructure. The third alignment, maintaining and developing the ability of 
detecting, eliminating and recovering from cyber threats and malfunctions in the organisa-
tions and companies who are essential for the vital functions of the society was aimed to the 
critical infrastructure. Through that alignment NESO was given the task to support critical 
infrastructure by reporting, guiding and training in order to enhance the cyber resilience of 
the vital businesses and organisations. However, according to Kananen this task did not 
brought anything new to the table and NESO has been doing similar tasks through its organisa-
tion for years. 
 
The National Emergency Supply Agency took part in to the preparation process of the imple-
mentation programme of the Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and the preparation work was 
time consuming and full of conflicts, but when the implementation programme was complete 
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NESA launched cyber security related activities such as KYBER TEO initiative and cyber securi-
ty manual for small and medium enterprises. (Kananen.2015, 275-276 )     
 
It is also clearly said in the Finland Cyber Security Strategy’s implementation programme that 
this strategy is in fact intended to be authority orientated. This authority orientated approach 
is justified by the Security Committee in a way that with this approach Finland’s central ad-
ministration has the best conditions to co-ordinately launch these proposals in the matters 
which are significant in a national context. (The Security Committee. 2013, 3) One can only 
estimate that, in what point of the making process of the implementation programme this 
statement was written and what were the reasons that led in to this, sense there has been 
substantial amount of criticism over the programme’s inability to take on consideration cyber 
security issues of critical infrastructure. 
 
Then again, the Security Committee is concerned that many of these proposals from the im-
plementation programme of the strategy are still in at planning stage and according to Ka-
nanen, the vision of the strategy is not enough, but resources are needed too. (Kananen. 
2015, 278)  
 
This wide range of criticism which Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and its implementation 
programme are receiving is noticeable and this should even more accelerate the need for 
generating structures in order to better take on consideration critical infrastructure. 
 
2.4 International examples of cyber security activities 
 
In the following two examples of cyber security activities from other countries are presented. 
These countries are the Netherlands and Estonia. One thing common with these two countries 
is that they have both revised their cyber security strategy. The Netherlands released its first 
strategy in year 2011 and published its second strategy in year 2013. Estonia, in other hand 
released its first cyber security strategy in year 2008 and the second one came 2014. (Prime 
Minister’s Office. 2015, 59-60) The Netherlands and Estonia are considered to be in the top 
countries worldwide regarding cyber security, for example, according to the Global Cyber 
Security Index, the Netherlands is in a sixth place and Estonia in fifth place. Therefore, it is 
suitable to use these countries as examples. (ABI Research.2015, 1-2)   
 
2.4.1 The Hague Security Delta, the Netherlands 
 
The Hague Security Delta is the European largest security cluster and it operates in three dif-
ferent cities in the Netherlands, Hague, Twente and Brabant. This cluster is comprised of 
businesses, government organisations and educational institutions and these entities are 
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working closely within cooperation in specific fields of cyber security, protection of the criti-
cal infrastructure, national and urban security and forensics. Cyber security issues are han-
dled in Hague. (thehaguesecuritydelta. 2016) 
 
The starting point of HSD dates back in the year 2010 when a project called Pieken in de Del-
ta project was established by some educational and governmental institutes. The purpose of 
this project was to get Netherlands’ security network professionalised, explore the possibili-
ties for developmental organisation or financial fund and to generate innovation establish-
ments within the four fields of interest. Like KYBER 2020 programme is now, the Hague Secu-
rity Delta was officially initiated as a project in 2012. Nowadays the Hague Security Delta is 
the largest security cluster in the Europe. (thehaguesecuritydelta. 2016)  
 
One of the recent activities of HSD in order to enhance the cyber security in critical infra-
structure in Netherlands was to develop a national multi-sector testbed for critical infrastruc-
ture. Testbed is a platform where hardware and software can be tested in a protected envi-
ronment. The report Securing Critical Infrastructures in the Netherlands – Towards National 
Testbed is rationalising the importance of the testbed by stating that industry is becoming 
more and more automatized and the society is increasingly adopting digital technologies, but 
the security behind those technologies are coming behind. Attacks against critical infrastruc-
ture have massive influence towards society, therefore, it is important that critical infra-
structure have a possibility to test their system and share the information. Being multi-sector 
testbed gives the different sectors of critical infrastructure a possibility to test their coopera-
tion because different sectors of critical infrastructure often rely on each other, for example, 
food industry is reliable of transportation. (Castellon & Frinkin. 2015, 6-19) 
 
When considering the fact that HSD was initially a two year project in order to enhance the 
security field in Netherlands and considering the fact what HSD is now, the growth has been 
enormous when regarding the statement that HSD is the biggest security cluster in Europe. 
 
2.4.2 Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit, Estonia  
 
Estonia adopted its first cyber security strategy in year 2008 and the attacks against Estonia 
were one of the trigger points of emphasizing the importance of cooperation between public 
authorities and private sector. (Kaska, Osula, Stinissen. 2013, 7) 
 
Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit is a part of the Estonian Defence League and it was also 
established in the aftermath of the 2007 cyberattacks against Estonia and this cyber unit fo-
cuses on enhancing the cyber security capabilities of Estonia and it is voluntary based. EDL CU 
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aims to promote public-private cooperation and strengthening the awareness of cyber securi-
ty.   
 
Estonian Defence League was founded in year 1918 and it is a voluntary military organisation 
which later became a foundation of the establishment of the Estonian armed forces, border 
guard and prison service. During the Soviet occupation Estonian Defence League was dis-
missed in 1940 and restored back again in year 1990.  The purpose of Estonian Defence 
League is to defend the independence of Estonia and enhance the preparedness of the Estoni-
an people.  
 
The proposal of establishing cyber security unit came after the cyberattacks in year 2007 and 
after those attacks it was recognised that the cooperation between public and private sector 
is essential in order to successfully handle the attacks. After the proposal was widely accept-
ed by Estonian cyber security community it started as a project which ended to the estab-
lishment of the Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit in January 2011. (Kaska et.al. 2013, 7–
9)   
 
The mission of the EDL CU is to protect the high-tech way of life in Estonia by the means of 
protecting critical information infrastructure and supporting national objectives of Estonian’s 
national defence. There are three identified objectives of EDL CU, which are 
 Developing a network of cooperation between public and private cyber security ex-
pertise 
 Improving the security of critical information infrastructure by sharing the knowledge 
and awareness of cyber threats and handing out the best practices 
 Promoting awareness, education and training by establishing information security 
training and education and by participating in, international and national, cyber se-
curity exercises. (Kaska, Osula, Stinissen. 2013, 11) 
 
Basically, the functions of EDL CU can be comprised in to two major themes. Firstly, strong 
cooperation between public and private sectors in a field of a cyber security, secondly, the 
strong Estonian tradition of volunteering in to national defence.  (Kaska, Osula, Stinissen. 
2013, 37)  
 
Even though EDL CU structurally integrated into paramilitary organisation let us not be fooled 
by that. The main message of this kind of establishment is that cyber security experts are 
gathering a forum in which cyber security issues can be handled with the cooperation of pub-
lic and private sector, in order to serve a bigger purpose; defending the nation, in which crit-
ical infrastructure is major part of it, against constantly evolving cyber threats. Estonia has 
also experienced a massive cyberattack in year 2007 and it was after that when this cyber 
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unit was established, meaning there was a national ambition, both in private and public sec-
tor, to prevent such incidents to occur again.  
 
2.5 Tools for the evaluation of the programme’s activities 
 
This part of this thesis introduces two commonly known management tools. These tools were 
adapted from European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) evaluation 
framework for cyber security strategies. These same tools will be adapted to the KYBER 2020 
programme and writer during this thesis process has made an evaluation framework for one of 
the themes of the programme, however the content of the evaluation framework for the pro-
gramme will be classified information, therefore it will not be presented in this thesis. 
 
2.5.1 ENISA’s evaluation framework 
 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is a centre of expertise 
of cyber security matters within European Union and its main objectives is to prevent, ad-
dress and respond problems related to information and network security. The main tasks of 
ENISA is counselling member states on information security, gathering and analysing infor-
mation on incidents related to security throughout Europe, advance the capability to handle 
information security threats through risk assessment and risk management and cooperation 
with various actors who are involved in information security especially building up public pri-
vate partnerships in the industry. (ENISA. 2016)  
 
An Evaluation framework for Cyber Security Strategies is ENISA produced report which sug-
gests two commonly known management tools for building an evaluation framework. These 
tools are Logic model and Key Performance Indicators. The evaluation framework produced by 
ENISA is based on the several interviews of cyber security experts, systematic review of exist-
ing cyber security strategies and the feedback what ENISA received from the Logic model 
from member states. (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). 
2014, 25) In the following subparagraphs these two management tools are presented.     
 
2.5.2 Logic model and key performance indicators 
 
First tool which ENISA is using in its evaluation framework for cyber security strategies is Log-
ic model. From the following this widely used management tool is defined and the principles 
of how to use the tool shortly explained.  
 
Logic model is, deceivingly simple, programme management tool which aims to explain to 
various stakeholders how to address acknowledged problems and how the programme that is 
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implemented is supposed to attack the problems in order to solve them. This tool is especially 
developed for those who are responsible of designing, conducting programmes and also for 
those who are reporting and using programme evaluations. The model itself has been in use 
from the 1960’s and have become more and more popular because of the demanding need for 
measuring performance in programmes. Logic model has various forms, but Wholey in his 
book presents a basic model which consists of inputs, activities, outputs, and short –term out-
comes, intermediate outcomes and long – term outcomes. 
  
Figure 5: Basic Logic Model (Wholey et al. 2010, 57) 
 
Inputs are resources put in the programme; these resources can be human and financial but 
also other elements which are supportive to the programme, such as, partnerships. The prob-
lem which the programme is attacking is also resource and there should be the type and level 
of that particular problem. Activities are the steps that need to be taken in order to produce 
the next step of the model, which is the programme output. Activities present the idea what 
the programme does. Outputs are the elements produced and manufactured to the pro-
gramme participants, these elements can be products, goods and services. 
  
After the outputs comes the outcomes which are the benefits to whom the programme is tar-
geted and these outcomes are usually divided into three sections. Firstly, short – term out-
comes, which are the changes that are caused directly by programme’s outputs. Secondly, 
intermediate outcomes, which are the outcomes what programme is supposed to produce 
from the short – term outcomes. Thirdly, Long – Term Outcomes, or programme impacts, 
which are expected to follow from the intermediate outcomes. 
 
There are also external contextual factors which can influence the programme and is not 
under the control of the programme, these external factors can produce either negative or 
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positive affect to the programme. According to Wholey et. al, there are two types factors 
that affect the programme, antecedent and mediating factors. Antecedent factors are at the 
beginning of the programme and can be such as economic factors, client characteristics and 
geographical variables. In other hand, mediating factors are taking place when the pro-
gramme is in progress and these factors can be for example new policies, change in staff, 
change in the economy and other similar programmes which can there for competition or for 
support. It is important to programme planners to take on consideration what are those un-
controlled factors that influences to the programme.  
 
According to Wholey et.al, there are five steps when building a logic model for programme, 
these steps are collecting the right information, defining the problem what the programme is 
supposed to solve, defining the elements for the logic model, making the logic model and get-
ting assurance of the logic model from the stakeholders. (Wholey et.al. 2010, 56-58) 
 
Collecting the right information means involving all the persons who are working the pro-
gramme in to the process in order to avoid the possibility that some essential parts of the 
programme are left out form the consideration. This gives the possibility to create much more 
coherent vision about how the programme is supposed to work. It is important to collect the 
information from various sources, such as documents related to the functions of the pro-
gramme and by interviewing the key stakeholders, internal and external, of the programme.  
 
By clearly defining the problem which the programme is supposed to affect positively gives 
the foundation to the development of the logic model.  This means defining all the factors 
which are causing the problem and defining the factors that the programme is addressing. It 
is also important to consider what is the context in which the programme is operating and 
how it might affect to the programme outcomes. Even though, there might be several factors 
that need to be addressed before finding all the problems which programme is trying to af-
fect, it is recommendable that all of these factors needs to be found. If failing to found all 
the factors, it might negatively affect to the long-term outcomes of the programme.      
 
The next step of building the logic model is defining the elements by categorizing the infor-
mation gathered and tagging it into programme’s resources, activities, outputs, outcomes or 
external factors and placing these elements in to logic model table presented in figure 10. 
There should be continuous check-ups of the accuracy and relevance of the information in the 
table and a good way to get assured that all the right elements are in place is to engage 
stakeholders. Meaning, if stakeholders can understand the logical flow from resources to long-
term outcomes there is possibility that all the elements are defined and there is clear se-
quence from one column to the next.     
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There are several different forms of logic models, but one shown in the figure five is the most 
basic one. The outlook of logic model depends on the complexity of the programme and if 
necessary there can be several different logic models showing different relevant aspects of 
the programme from the point of view of different stakeholders. It is better to start with the 
easiest form of logic model and then, if necessary, modify that model in to a more complex 
design. This step takes patience, even though drawing logic model can be seen as a simple 
task, it is hard work behind the model what makes it appear simple. Nevertheless, logic mod-
el is should be simple and understandable graphic representation, making the stakeholders to 
understand the hypothesized linkages of the model. 
 
As the logic model is complete, there should be continuous evaluation of the programme logic 
and how it is functioning with the respect of the programmes goals and how the programme 
works in order to achieve its short-term, intermediate and long-term outcomes. The verifica-
tion process of the logic model should engage all the relevant stakeholders. (Wholey et.al. 
2010, 62 – 72) 
 
According to ENISA, logic model is a tool that can show the logic behind the actions taken by 
the program and this tool is used to inspect the relationship between the inputs, outputs and 
outcomes. (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). 2014, 28) 
   
Another tool that is suggested by ENISA, alongside Logic model, is Key Performance Indica-
tors. From the following the concept of KPI’s are shortly explained. 
 
According to Parmenter (Parmenter. 2010) key performance indicators are the measures that 
focus on the most critical aspects of organisational performance that are vital for the success 
of the organisation. In order to clarify what Key Performance Indicators are Parmenter is di-
viding KPI’s in to different fundamental characteristics in which he is also aiming to differen-
tiate KPI’s from Key Result Indicators. These characteristics are 
 KPI’s are not measured financially 
 KPI’s needs to be measured frequently 
 KPI’s has to have the attention of the highest level of the organisation and the rele-
vant staff members 
 KPI’s have to indicate what actions needs to be done if something is wrong 
 KPI’s has to be tied to a person or a team in order to clarify the responsibilities 
 KPI has to have an effect. Don’t measure something what does not have impact 
 KPI’s have to encourage the people to make relevant procedures (Parmenter 2010, 4 
– 8) 
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Parmenter continues with Key Performance Indicators that there are four foundation stones in 
order to have ultimate success when implementing KPI’s. These foundation stones are, creat-
ing partnerships with all the relevant stakeholders, transferring the power of influence from 
high level organisation to working staff, in other words, transfer the power to the frontline, 
measure those matters only which are relevant for the success and link performance meas-
urement to existing critical success factors and strategic objectives. (Parmenter 2010, 29-36) 
 
Accroding to ENISA, key performance indicators are criteria which can be chosen to measure 
the performance or advancement of a policy, strategy or, in NESA’s case, a programme. KPI’s 
can be qualitative or quantitative depending on the purpose and because ENISA is focusing on 
the long term outcomes it has chosen to use qualitative measures. Accroding to ENISA, by se-
lecting the correct key performance indicators at the beginning of the strategy’s implementa-
tion, it gives to the stakeholders a possibility to track the advancement of the strategy, but 
also during the evaluation phase of the program KPI’s can offer information if there is a need 
for revision of the program. (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA). 2014, 29) When designing key performance indicators ENISA is emphasizing some 
basic characteristics which KPI’s need to have in order to them become valuable. These char-
acteristics are specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, time – related, governable and 
KPI’s should have impact. (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENI-
SA). 2014, 2-3) 
 
3 Methodology 
 
In the following the methodology of this thesis will be presented.  
 
3.1 Qualitative research 
 
This thesis aims to understand the importance of protecting critical infrastructure against 
cyber threats through interviews and review of relevant documents. Therefore, a qualitative 
research is suitable for the research method. 
 
Conducting a qualitative research is suitable when there is no information, theory or prior 
research on the subject, researcher wants to have a deep vision about the phenomena, trian-
gulation is used or there is need to have good description about the phenomena.  
 
Qualitative research enables the understanding of the phenomena, in other words under-
standing what the phenomena is all about. According to Kananen (Kananen 2015), there are 
four different aspects when conducting a qualitative research and in which the researcher 
should embrace himself 
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 Commitment in to time consuming field work 
 Commitment in to analysing the collected data 
 Commitment in to time consuming writing process 
 Tolerance of uncertainty (Kananen J. 2015, 70-73) 
 
For this thesis, all the above mentioned characteristics were realized.  
 
According to Hirsjärvi et.al (Hirsjärvi et.al 1997 12th edition) there are seven characteristics 
of qualitative research 
1. By nature research is a comprehensive acquisition of information and the material is 
collected in natural and realistic conditions 
2. Preferring human beings as an instrument of information gathering. Researcher is re-
lying more to his ability to observe rather than using measuring instruments to get the 
information 
3. Usage of inductive analysis. The aim of the researcher is to reveal unexpected fac-
tors; therefore it is not important to test theories or hypothesis, but to inspect the 
data with detail. 
4. The usage of qualitative methods in the acquisition of the data. Preferring the meth-
ods where the points of views of those who are the target of the research are re-
vealed. For example,   theme interviews is one the methods. 
5. Choosing the target group deliberately, not using random sample. 
6. The research plan is shaped as the research is proceeding. Research is flexible and 
the plans will be changed if necessary. 
7. Handling the cases as they are unique and the data is interpreted accordingly. 
(Hirsijärvi et.al 1997, 155) 
  
3.2 Interviews 
 
According to Kananen (Kananen 2015) interviews are very flexible methods where interviewer 
can guide the interviewee and if necessary make new questions about the subject in hand. 
The forms of interviews can change from open discussion to very strict questions which are 
presented in the same order to each every interviewee. 
 
Theme interviews is the most common way to conduct interviews when collecting information 
to qualitative research, however the most common mistake with theme interviews is that the 
interviewer has readymade specific questions for each specific theme. This indicates that the 
interviewer already knows the phenomenon so clearly that by conducting only theme inter-
view is the wrong research method. (Kananen J. 2015, 143-146) 
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According to Hirsijärvi et.al (Hirsijärvi et.al 1997 12th edition, 197) theme interview is inter-
mediate form of questionnaire and open interview, and with theme interviews it is typical 
that the subject areas are known but there is no strict formulated questions and the order of 
the questions are unknown. (Hirsijärvi et.al 1997, 197) 
 
For this thesis, three different persons were interviewed. Two of the persons are working for 
the National Emergency Supply Agency and one of the interviewees for the National Cyber 
Security Center Finland. Two of the interviews were conducted in the premises of the Nation-
al Emergency Supply Agency in Helsinki during early spring of the year 2016 and the third in-
terview was conducted in the premises of Finland’s Communications and Regulatory Authority 
in Helsinki as well. All of the interviewees are experts in a field cyber security and are closely 
working within the KYBER 2020 programme and all of them have prior experience in the field 
of protecting critical infrastructure against cyber threats. From every interview there is a 
memo written which can be found from the writer. 
  
Persons who were interviewed for this thesis were 
 Director, Sauli Savisalo, National Emergency Supply Agency 
 Business Continuity Manager, Erkki Räsänen, National Emergency Supply Agency 
 Special advisor, Miikka Salonen, National Cyber Security Center Finland. 
 
All of the interviewees agreed to appear in this thesis by their own name. 
 
4 Results of the interviews 
 
This chapter represents the results of the interviews and also introduces the organisations 
behind the KYBER 2020 programme. These Interviews had three themes in it. Firstly, because 
of the reason that there is no public information of the KYBER 2020 programme, the infor-
mation about this programme was gathered via interviews. Secondly, the reason why this pro-
gramme is implemented was discussed and thirdly there was discussion about the need for 
monitoring and evaluating the programme’s activities. Before the results of the interviews, 
the organisations behind the KYBER 2020 program are briefly introduced.  
 
4.1 Organisations behind KYBER 2020 
 
In the following subchapters the organisations behind the KYBER 2020 programme are shortly 
presented. These organisations are National Emergency Supply Organisation, National Emer-
gency Supply Agency, Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority and National Cyber Secu-
rity Center Finland. 
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4.2 The National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) 
 
The National Emergency Supply Organisation is a network organisation which maintains and 
develops the security of supply in Finland. Main goal of NESO is to secure the operational pre-
conditions of those organisations which are vital for the security of supply and through that 
secure the functions of the whole nation. Within NESO hundreds of entities, authorities and 
associations from various sectors of the nation are working towards the common goals. NESO 
is comprised of National Emergency Supply Agency, National Emergency Supply Council and 
Sectors and Pools from different aspects of society. (Huoltovarmuus. 2016) 
 
 
Figure 6: NESO (Huoltovarmuus 2016) 
 
4.3 The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) 
 
The National Emergency Supply Agency is an organisation under the Ministry of Employment 
and Economy with main objective to develop and maintain security of supply in Finland. The 
Degree on the National Emergency Supply Agency has defined more specific tasks to NESA 
which are 
• Acting as secretariat for the National Board of Economic Defence 
• Maintaining security of supply stockpiles 
• Promoting and coordinating public authorities' readiness to manage and guide the na-
tional economy in emergency situations 
• Promoting the readiness planning of companies 
• Ensuring the functioning of the national technical infrastructures 
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• Safeguarding the production of necessary goods and services under emergency condi-
tions 
• Analysing threats against security of supply and drawing up plans for countermeasures 
• Maintaining relations to similar bodies and agencies in other countries. 
 
The operations of NESA are headed by the chief executive officer with the guidelines given by 
the National Emergency Supply Council and the functions of NESA are funded by an extra-
budgetary fund. (Huoltovarmuus. 2016) 
  
 
Figure 7: NESA (Huoltovarmuus 2016) 
 
4.3.1 Examples of NESA’s cyber security activities 
 
KYBER 2020 programme is not the first effort in which the National Emergency Supply Agency 
is trying face the constantly evolving cyber threats against critical infrastructure. From the 
following, few examples of NESA’s activities in a field of cyber security are presented.  
 
In order to improve cyber security of critical industry the National Emergency Supply Agency, 
with cooperation with its partners, launched KYBER-TEO initiative in year 2014 where new 
services were tested and provided to the critical industry which are utilizing automatization 
in their operations in order to enhance the cyber security and business continuity of these 
entities. With this initiative Finland’s critical industry has improved its capabilities against 
cyberattacks and the work done during this initiative will benefit also other organisations that 
are involved with the security of supply more or less. (Emma Karki. 2014)  
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Suomen Huoltovarmuusdata (SHVD) is a data centre established by the National Emergency 
Supply Agency and its aim is to be top secure service operator for the most critical infor-
mation technology in Finland. Reason for establishing SVHD came from the Governments deci-
sion on the security of supply goals from year 2008, which states that the functions of socie-
ty’s most critical information technology needs to be secured during emergency conditions. 
In year 2008 established data centre is service provider for the most critical information sys-
tems and aims to ensure that the functions of information systems will operate in all condi-
tions. (Huoltovarmuus. 2016) 
 
HAVARO is an observation and warning system of information security breaches designed es-
pecially to the critical infrastructure in Finland. HAVARO is one of the products of Cyber Secu-
rity Center Finland and it is result of the long term development work between National 
Emergency Supply Agency and Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority and it is com-
prised of versatile technical solutions and it is designed only to monitor information security 
breaches, not communication of an individual persons. There are approximately 20 to 40 or-
ganisations involved with HAVARO, but the identities of the organisations are kept secret. 
Joining the HAVARO system is based on voluntariness, but if an organisation decides to join 
HAVARO system it has to have already high standards in information security and the ability to 
utilize the observation data provided by HAVARO system. Systematic deviations detected by 
HAVARO is analysed by the National Cyber Security Center Finland and then the information 
about the critical attacks against the system is sent to the organisations. (Varmuuden vuoksi. 
2016) 
 
HUOVI–portal is a designed to support municipalities, authorities and critical infrastructure in 
preparedness of severe malfunctions. HUOVI–portal serves as information channel and data-
bank to the organisations and it provides instructions, publications and articles related pre-
paredness and business continuity and the portal enables the exchange of confidential infor-
mation between different actors inside the portal. One of the tools of the portal is a maturity 
assessment tool for business continuity. With the help of this tool organisations can estimate 
the level of the business continuity within the organisation. With the answers what this as-
sessment tool provides organisations can get useful pointers to preparedness and an overview 
of the organisations position compared to general level of business continuity in a specific 
field. The usage of HUOVI–portal is safe and the data between the system and the user is se-
cured in a way that no outsider can get access to the information.  (Huoltovarmuus. 2016) 
 
4.4 The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) 
 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority is an organisation under the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications and through its activities FICORA is developing reliable infor-
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mation society and ensuring that Finnish society has a secure access to different electronic 
services. FICORA is maintaining an overview of the functionality of electronic communications 
networks and information security and will inform society from possible information security 
threats. FICORA’s organisation consists of seven divisions which are Administration, Infor-
mation Management, Communications, Stakeholders, National Cyber Security Centre, Mar-
kets, Spectrum Management and the head of Ficora is Director-General. (Viestintävirasto. 
2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 8: FICORA (Viestintävirasto. 2016) 
 
4.5 The National Cyber Security Center (NCSC-FI) 
 
The National Cyber Security Center Finland has been operating under FICORA since 1 January 
2014 and is a national information security authority in Finland. The focus of NCSC-FI is to 
ensure secure and undisturbed functions of the common public communications networks and 
communication services and securing the vital functions of the society and through an agree-
ment made with NESA, NCSC-FI will in its part make sure that the functioning of vital tech-
nical systems that are essential for the security of supply are protected. (Viestintävirasto 
2016)  
 
The National Cyber Security Center Finland was established to function as to service authori-
ties, business life and other actors in order to enhance national cyber security and according 
to Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy, the main tasks of the NCSC-FI are  
1. “Compile and disseminate the cyber security situation picture” 
2. “Compile and maintain a cyber threat risk analysis, in conjunction with different ad-
ministrative branches and actors” 
3. “Support the competent authorities and actors in the private sector in the manage-
ment of widespread cyber incidents” 
4. “Intensify cooperation and support the development of expertise.” 
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According to the Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy’s background dossier, the main task of the 
NCSC-FI is creating, compiling, maintaining and distributing the cyber security situation pic-
ture and providing it to those who need it. NCSC-FI is mainly acting as a supportive body in 
cyber incidents by assisting the authority in charge.  (The Security Committee. 2013, 23-24) 
  
4.6 KYBER 2020 programme 
 
According to the interviews, KYBER 2020 programme is a comprehensive cyber security pro-
gramme designed by National Emergency Supply Agency with cooperation of National Emer-
gency Supply Organisation and Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA). The 
main goal of the KYBER 2020 programme is to enhance the cyber security of the most critical 
infrastructure in Finland. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
KYBER 2020 programme has eight themes in it. However, the first theme, “theme zero”, 
serves only as in a supervisory role to all other themes, which are aiming to represent con-
crete actions in which NESA and its cooperative partners are aiming to improve the cyber se-
curity of the critical infrastructure in Finland. According to Räsänen, these themes were se-
lected and designed by the experts working with the programme after a wide sampling of in-
terviews in which wide variety of distinguished cyber security experts underlined the needs 
and hopes of how critical infrastructure should be protected against cyber threats. In the fol-
lowing these themes are shortly introduced. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
  
The aim of the “theme zero” is to adapt this cyber security programme with other existing 
national programmes and strategies and also making sure that programme will achieve its ul-
timate goal. According to Savisalo, this theme is intended to serve as overseeing body which 
monitors the implementation and success of the other themes. Therefore it does not have 
similar functions than the other themes have. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
  
Theme one is concentrating in to the trust issues of digital methods and abilities to control 
cyber threats. Throughout this theme KYBER 2020 programme is aiming to enhance the busi-
ness continuity of the critical infrastructure and making sure that businesses has better 
knowledge of the their critical dependences.  (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
Theme two focuses on enhancing the preparedness of the critical infrastructure by the means 
of designing and conducting cyber security exercises and developing specific consultation ser-
vices where companies can get support and consultation in cyber security matters. With this 
theme KYBER 2020 programme is seeking to increase the operational capabilities of the criti-
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cal infrastructure and preparedness to tolerate and to react against severe cyber threats. 
(Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
Theme three is focusing on to the development of the ability to recognise information securi-
ty threats and making the exchange of vital information between companies more effective 
and to cover the whole value chain of the critical infrastructure. In order to reach these is-
sues KYBER 2020 programme will focus on developing already existing observation and warn-
ing systems by drawing up a development strategy to these systems. One of these systems is 
HAVARO system, which is shortly introduced in this thesis. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
Theme four is compiled of three elements which are communications, situation awareness 
and exchange of information. Within this theme, there are several measures taken but the 
main measure is that NESA with cooperation with National Cyber Security Center Finland is 
aiming to develop a common platform for communications and exchange of information 
where critical infrastructure can get the information they need in order to perform infor-
mation security measures quickly and efficiently. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
Theme five focuses on international cooperation and it aims to recognise possible cyber 
threats that are wide ranging and long lasting in an international scale, and which can pro-
duce severe losses to the businesses. Also, to develop the cyber resilience of the critical in-
frastructure with cooperation of certain international organisations by the means of changing 
information and best practises. With this theme KYBER 2020 programme will try to hasten the 
development of cyber security capabilities of critical infrastructure by utilizing those best 
practices. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
  
Theme six concentrates on the observation of the future by developing novel means and 
methods to recognise new threat models and by developing better defence mechanisms 
against cyber threats. Throughout this theme the programme is focusing on to create net-
works where these cyber security trends can be observed and recognised efficiently and 
through that creating conditions where the understanding of a changing business environment 
can be understood. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
Theme seven is focusing on the cyber security of the critical industry which is utilizing au-
tomatization in their operations. This theme has adopted one already existing initiative, 
which is KYBER – TEO initiative and throughout the KYBER 2020 programme, continue the ef-
forts if the KYBER – TEO. More information about KYBER – TEO can be found in chapter 4.3.1. 
(Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
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The implementation of the KYBER 2020 programme is on its way and some concrete work to-
wards the themes of this programme has already been done. According to Räsänen, NESA is 
aiming to appoint so called “theme supervisor” to each and every theme and these supervi-
sors are intended to represent the highest expertise of knowledge regarding each theme. For 
example, for theme six it could suitable to appoint supervisors from academic field, but NESA 
is only at the starting point of considering suitable entities for every theme and only two 
themes has had its own “supervisor” appointed at this point. Savisalo also emphasizes that 
these theme supervisors are meant to be organisations or institutes, not individual persons. 
(Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
From the figure below the basic structures of the KYBER 2020 programme are presented. 
 
 
 
 
  
As seen, one of the themes is focusing on the monitoring of the implementation and success 
of the other themes. National Emergency Supply Agency is aiming to create so called “Project 
Management Office” to theme zero, in which the activities of the programme are supervised. 
With these arrangements the focus is to create smaller projects in to the themes as the pro-
Figure 9: KYBER 2020 programme (Writer) 
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gramme continues its existence and NESA’s primary task is to oversee and fund these pro-
jects, if they turn out to be effective, relevant and serves the common goal of the pro-
gramme. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
Like the name KYBER 2020 let us presume, this programme is intended to be a five year pro-
gramme and at the end of the programme, critical infrastructure in Finland is supposed to be 
more protected against cyber threats than it is currently. However, according to Savisalo, 
through this programme NESA aiming to create much more permanent status of creating cyber 
security in critical infrastructure. Räsänen adds that this programme is only meant to be an 
initiation stage and after year 2020 the structures of this programme are embedded in to Fin-
land’s cyber security scheme in a way that it becomes self-sufficient with positive effects on 
critical infrastructure. Savisalo also points out that establishing this kind of programme re-
quires cooperation. Therefore this programme is a joint initiative with above mentioned or-
ganisations. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
From the following figure, the framework of the KYBER 2020 programme is introduced. As we 
can see the Security Strategy of Society is defining the most vital functions of the society and 
Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy is giving the vision, operations model and strategic align-
ments of cyber security. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Framework of KYBER 2020 Programme (Writer) 
 50 
  
4.7 Reasons behind the KYBER 2020 programme 
 
All of the interviewees stressed the fact that there is a cyber shortfall in Finland’s cyber se-
curity landscape and there is an order for taking more actions towards the protection of the 
critical infrastructure. According to Savisalo, the functions of the society are reliant of the 
critical infrastructure’s ability to tolerate cyber threats and if this ability is compromised it 
can have negative impacts on the society. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
Finland’s most critical infrastructure is doing well against the cyber threats, but there is a 
need for new approach in order to assist the efforts of the critical infrastructure. However, 
according to Salonen, even though critical infrastructure is accomplishing well against cyber 
threats, there can be significant variations between the skills in different organisations and 
that is why there is a need for this kind of approach. Therefore, one of the targets of the KY-
BER 2020 programme is to enhance the change of information between the critical infrastruc-
ture and authorities and through that enhance the cyber capabilities of the organisations. 
(Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
Another fact which Räsänen stressed was that Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy’s implemen-
tation programme is too authority orientated and it does not have specific and comprehensive 
actions towards the protection of the critical infrastructure in Finland. According to Räsänen, 
the KYBER 2020 programme is in some ways an answer to the implementation programme of 
the Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy. This issue was agreed by Savisalo and Salonen also. 
However, Salonen is reminding that there was a need for Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy 
and it came at the right time and it is taking stand on the protection of the critical infrastruc-
ture against cyber threats, but the measures were not adequate enough. Therefore, there are 
reasons to take concrete actions. According to Savisalo, Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and 
its implementation programme is successfully defining the responsibilities of different actors, 
including NESA, but Savisalo is also stating that the lack of concrete actions is the main rea-
sons for this KYBER 2020 programme. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
According to Savisalo, even though NESA has already done work towards the cyber threats 
against critical infrastructure, for instance HAVARO system and Huoltovarmuusdata OY, the 
comprehensive structure of the KYBER 2020 programme will do its part by filling the hole in 
Finland’s cyber security pitfall. Savisalo also reminds that one of the tasks of NESA is con-
nected to the protection of the information society and cyber security issues needs to be es-
sential part of it. 
 
All the interviewees also stressed the issue that NESA is mandated to assist critical infrastruc-
ture in continuity management and cyber security naturally falls into this category as con-
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stantly evolving issue in Finland’s security landscape. According to Salonen, due the reason 
that critical infrastructure is mainly owned by the private sector there is also a need for a 
better linkage between public authorities and private sector also in matters of cyber security 
and NESA is an organisation which serves as an entity aligning the cooperation between these 
two sectors. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
4.8 Monitoring and evaluation of the KYBER 2020 programme 
 
All of the interviewees of the NESA and NCSC-FI experts acknowledged that there is a need to 
monitor the progress of the programme. According to Räsänen, one of the main reasons is to 
assure that this programme has real positive affect to the critical infrastructures struggle 
against cyber threats and Räsänen continues, whenever there is public money used the re-
sponsible parties’ who are involved with programme needs to make sure that the money is 
used in a proper and visible manner. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
According to Savisalo, as this programme continues its growth and become more active, the 
amount of stakeholders will increase also, therefore it is essential to NESA have control over 
the activities inside the programme. Savisalo also reminds that, like the other initiatives that 
NESA has launched, and the aim of this programme, is to gradually diminish the activities of 
NESA inside the programme and become more of a background organisation which only funds 
and supervises the functions of the KYBER 2020 programme. Therefore, it is important that 
there is a tool or method of how these functions can be supervised. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salo-
nen) 
 
Another important fact which Salonen notes is that this programme is voluntary on behalf of 
the critical infrastructure. Therefore it is important to show the effectiveness of the pro-
gramme. By monitoring and evaluating the actions taken by the programme it provides NESA 
and its cooperative partners a possibility to demonstrate how the programme is supposed to 
work and how the measures that are taken will improve the cyber security of critical infra-
structure. This issue was agreed by other interviewees also. (Savisalo, Räsänen, Salonen) 
 
5 Analysis 
 
The functionality of critical infrastructure is essential for the society and cyberattacks against 
critical infrastructure can have a remarkable affect to the vital functions of the society and 
through that people’s lives. For instance, major disturbance in power supply can have cata-
strophic consequences and can cause indirectly loss of lives. One scenario was presented in 
the beginning of this thesis. One of the differences between this fictional scenario and real 
life incident which occurred in Ukraine was that it has not happened in Finland, yet. Another 
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difference was that no fatal accidents occurred in the Ukrainian case, but if the cyberattack 
in Ukraine would have prolonged there might have been. There are studies presented in this 
thesis which are implicating the fact that the cyber threats against private sector, including 
critical infrastructure, are growing and becoming more frequent. For example, the study 
made by Intel Security reveals that cyber threats against critical infrastructure will continue 
its growth and there is a possibility that within the next three years there will be a cyberat-
tack against critical infrastructure that can indirectly cause loss of lives. The same study also 
reveals that 90 % of the respondents have experienced a severe cyberattack against their or-
ganisation. Europol is also estimating that cyber threats against critical infrastructure are in-
creasing.  
 
The study, conducted by Taloustutkimus OY also reveals some worrying issues of the percep-
tions of cyber threats in Finnish companies. The study in a way implicates that cyber threats 
are taken seriously, but yet no pre-emptive measures were taken by the companies. The 
study mostly sets the responsibility towards the authorities. However, the urge for the com-
prehensive cyber security should come from the companies themselves, but it is in some ways 
understandable that if the companies do not know where to get information and assistance 
regarding cyber security.  
 
Almost all of the studies presented in this thesis are also emphasizing the need of cooperation 
between public authorities and private sector. In Finland, the National Emergency Supply Or-
ganisation and the National Emergency Supply Agency are the entities which are mainly re-
sponsible of aligning the cooperation between public authorities and private sector and it is 
clearly stated in the Governments Decision on the Security of Supply Goals that that the Na-
tional Emergency Supply Agency has a mandate to assist critical infrastructure in various is-
sues. In this modern world and due the reason that everything is connected to the information 
networks, cyber security should be one the main areas of NESA’s interest and activities. 
 
Another issue what came up in this thesis was the lack of leadership in cyber security issues. 
One explanatory thing could be the way how leadership in emergency situation are organised 
and explained in the Security Strategy for Society. Like said in this strategy, the highest au-
thority is in the hands of Prime Minister’s Office and all the ministries have strategic duties in 
their field. For example, one of the strategic tasks of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
is to secure the social and health care services and environmental health care services (Minis-
try of Defence. 2010, 86). If there are disturbances in that field, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health is the main responsible ministry before the Prime Minister’s Office. Finland’s 
Cyber Security Strategy is a part of Security Strategy for Society and follows the same princi-
ples of leadership that are defined in the Security Strategy for Society. For this reason, in 
cyber security incidents as well, it is the ministry which is taking over the control of the is-
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sues and, for example, if there is a cyberattack against hospital, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health is the ministry in lead when handling that cyber security incident.      
 
Finland is ranked high in international studies regarding cyber security and was one of the 
first countries which published its own cyber security strategy in year 2013. However, accord-
ing to the Global Cyber Security Index and EU Cyber Security Dashboard Finland does not have 
any sector specific plans or programs in a matter of cyber security. Like explained in the ear-
lier parts of this thesis, this is not completely true and there has been cooperation between 
the public authorities and private sector in Finland. However, this notion made by these stud-
ies only gives NESA and its partners more valid reason to implement and promote the KYBER 
2020 programme.   
 
There are two main reasons why NESA and its cooperative partners are implementing the KY-
BER 2020 programme. Firstly, like earlier explained, cyber threats against critical infrastruc-
ture are real and we can almost in monthly bases read news of cyberattacks against vital 
functions of the society throughout the world. Also, the recognised need to enhance the co-
operation between the private and public sector is one of the reasons that implicates to the 
need for this kind of approach.  
 
Secondly, Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and its implementation programme are failing to 
take in to consideration critical infrastructure in a way that it is sufficient enough and there 
can be a variety of reasons why the implementation programme is too authority orientated. 
This issue came up with the interviews and the information presented in this thesis. Maybe, 
one of the reasons could be that Finland has done only one cyber security strategy and there 
were not enough understanding how cyber security issues really are concerning the nation as 
a whole, not only authorities. Yet again, the strategy and its implementation programme 
identifies the need of protecting critical infrastructure against cyber threats and the National 
Emergency Supply Organisation and the National Emergency Supply Agency as entities which 
are providing support to the critical infrastructure, but as we can see from the main devel-
opment targets of cyber security strategy’s implementation programme, there is only one 
issue where business life is acknowledged. All the others were authority orientated. Even 
though, this authority orientated approach is acknowledged by the implementation pro-
gramme itself, this fact only accelerates the need for making adjustments towards more pro-
tection of the critical infrastructure against cyber threats. Like said earlier in this thesis, one 
can only guess in what point of the implementation programme’s writing process the idea of 
adding authority orientated approach to the implementation programme came. 
 
In a way, the KYBER 2020 programme is serving as a counterweight to the Finland’s Cyber Se-
curity Strategy’s implementation programme’s authority orientated approach. From the fol-
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lowing figure the main development targets of Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy’s implemen-
tation programme can be seen on the left side and on the right side are the themes of NESA’s 
KYBER 2020 programme. 
 
   
 
 
However, if Finland in some point is revising its strategy, it would suitable to implement the 
activities of the KYBER 2020 programme into the new strategy, like KYBER – TEO was recog-
nised in the implementation programme. That way the KYBER 2020 programme will get more 
credibility if government is acknowledging the programme and it might also deepen much 
needed cooperation between public and private sector in matters of cyber security. As this 
thesis is presenting the cooperation between these two sectors are essential in cyber security 
and one of the main reason for that is that Finland is highly developed information society 
and is extremely dependent on the functions of the information networks and systems and 
this includes also critical infrastructure. Since the critical infrastructure is mainly owned by 
the private sector, the cooperation is essential.  
 
Two international examples presented in this thesis can serve as an example how other coun-
tries are aligning the cooperation between public and private sector. For example, the Hague 
Security Cluster in Netherlands serves as an example how different actors from various fields 
come together in order to establish a network of professionals and creating new innovations. 
Estonia on the other hand relies on the strong patriotism and through that enhances the co-
operation in cyber security. Surely, there are many other examples of how the cooperation 
between public and private sector are organised, but these two countries can serve as fine 
examples in that field and maybe NESA can adopt some good practices from these countries. 
 
In order to avoid the same what has happened to the implementation programme of Finland’s 
Cyber Security Strategy, there is a need for monitoring and evaluating the implementation 
Figure 11: Finland's Cyber Security Strategy's implementation programme vs. KYBER 2020 prog-
ramme (Writer) 
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and actions of the KYBER 2020 programme. The evaluation framework provided by ENISA and 
KYBER 2020 programme has a common denominator, which is cyber security. Therefore the 
utilization of this evaluation framework could be justified. Since the KYBER 2020 programme 
is meant to be dynamic programme and the functions within KYBER 2020 can vary and change 
during the existence of the programme, it would suitable for NESA to implement these sug-
gested tools in to themes. Since, one of the basic ideas of logic model is that it is supposed to 
be dynamic as well. One possible approach would be that, as soon as, there will be smaller 
projects created into to themes and in order to NESA monitor and evaluate those projects, 
NESA would demand from those appointed theme supervisors to develop an evaluation 
framework by using these two tools, which are presented in this thesis.  
 
Like the interviewees said, KYBER 2020 programme intends to serve as much more permanent 
solution than just a five year programme and NESA’s intentions to nominate “supervisors” to 
each and every theme leads to the conclusion that this programme needs to be monitored in 
a way or another. By utilizing Logic model and Key Performance Indicators in project man-
agement, it gives NESA and all the stakeholders who are involved in the programme a possibil-
ity to see how the different smaller projects inside the programme is supposed to assist the 
main goal of the programme, which was to enhance the cyber security of the critical infra-
structure and creating more permanent structures in the fight against rapidly evolving and 
growing cyber threats.   
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Through the expert interviews and relevant literature this thesis attempted to explain the 
cyber security scheme in Finland. During the writing of this thesis, it came clear that there is 
a growing need to protect critical infrastructure against cyber threats and Finland’s Cyber 
Security Strategy’s implementation programme is not focusing enough on the protection of 
the critical infrastructure. Like said in the beginning of this thesis, critical infrastructure is 
mainly owned by the private sector and the functionality of the private sector, especially 
critical infrastructure, is vital for the society. Therefore, there is a need for putting more 
focus on the cyber security issues in critical infrastructure.   
 
Another part of this thesis was to make an evaluation framework for the KYBER 2020 pro-
gramme. This framework utilized two commonly known management tools, logic mode and 
key performance indicators, and with this framework NESA can have a possibility to monitor 
and evaluate the progress of the programme. 
 
This thesis process is the writer’s last contribution to the National Emergency Supply Agency 
and hopefully the effort has not been futile, but this thesis has brought value to the National 
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Emergency Supply Agency and its work as securing the functions of the critical infrastructure 
and through that protecting the vital functions of the society. 
 
6.1 Answering the research questions 
 
Is there a need for a national programme called KYBER 2020 programme for protecting criti-
cal infrastructure against cyber threats in Finland? 
 
There are two main reasons why there should be national preparedness against cyber threats. 
Firstly, cyber threats and cyberattacks against the vital functions of society, including critical 
infrastructure are increasing. Secondly, Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and its implementa-
tion programme is too authority orientated, therefore there is a need to approach the cyber 
security issues of critical infrastructure in a new manner. 
 
The reason that critical infrastructure is mainly owned and operated by the private sector 
there is a clear reason for more cooperation between public authorities and private compa-
nies. The National Emergency Supply Agency as an organisation mandated to serve as a link 
between public and private sector in order to align the cooperation between these sectors is 
the right entity to deal with the problems which critical infrastructure is facing in a field of 
cyber security. 
  
How the effectiveness of the KYBER 2020 programme should be evaluated? 
 
This thesis is suggesting two commonly known management tools for the evaluation and moni-
toring of the KYBER 2020 programme, logic model and key performance indicators. The usage 
of these tools is also recommended by the European Union Agency for Network and Infor-
mation Security (ENISA) to serve as building blocks of an evaluation framework for cyber secu-
rity strategies in member states. Due the reason that this ENISA provided evaluation frame-
work for cyber security strategies and KYBER 2020 programme has common denominator, 
cyber security, the utilization of this evaluation framework could be justified. In addition to 
this, during the writing process of this thesis writer has made an evaluation framework for the 
one of the themes of the KYBER 2020 programme. However, due the reason that this evalua-
tion framework is classified material, it will be not presented in this thesis. 
 
7 Validity & Reliability of the research 
 
According to Kananen (Kananen 2015) the research process is always exposed to mistakes, 
these mistakes can come from the researcher himself or the material he is researching and 
the mistakes can be either conscious or subconscious. With inspection of the validity & relia-
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bility of the research some of these mistakes can be eliminated, however the researcher him-
self is the biggest influencer to validity and reliability of his research. For example, research-
er can with different selections to choose such theories and models which are supporting his 
results or the material is collected in a way that it is supporting the chosen theories, accord-
ing to Kananen, this is a common strategy in scientific world.  
 
In qualitative research, researcher always has influence to subject he is studying and this in-
fluence cannot be removed but it can be acknowledged, however researcher is never allowed 
to influence the phenomenon because it might distort the results. Scientifically this is called 
reactivity which means same as contamination of the material. (Kananen J. 2015, 338-339) 
 
This thesis intends to be neutral and follow the existing guidelines. However, it is evident 
that writer working closely within the organisation which is implementing the KYBER 2020 
programme and aiming to find justification to it might have, conscious or subconscious, agen-
da in order to find the right information that would suitable for the benefit of NESA’s ambi-
tions. Though, writer is working his best to not to get influenced too much. 
 
The results of this research are gathered from the interviews and most recent studies in the 
field of cyber security. The results indicate that there is a growing need to assist critical in-
frastructure against cyber threats. One the main reason for this is that Finland’s Cyber Securi-
ty Strategy’s implementation programme does not take on consideration the private sector 
and critical infrastructure in its actions. This fact has been verified by all of the interviewees 
and some of the documents presented in this thesis. 
 
8 Suggestions for further research 
   
For further research the answer seems obvious. After the KYBER 2020 programme has been 
implemented and is running, it would suitable to conduct research which is evaluating the 
success of the programme. If NESA adapt the suggested management tools, Logic model and 
Key Performance Indicators, it would suitable to use the same tools for the evaluation of the 
programme’s activities. 
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